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The FAA Exclusionary Clause: Are
We Headed
for a Broader Interpretation of
Interstate Commerce?
Miller v. Public Storage Management, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") encompasses a vast spectrum of
arbitration controversies. The FAA provides that "[a] written provision in .. . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable."2 The preceding section of the Act, however, states that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."3 In their efforts to maintain a balance between these competing interests,
many courts have attempted to assemble a consistent definition of the term
"commerce" throughout the act for the purpose of defining who is exempt and who
is not exempt.4 This balance has not always been easily met, however, and such
efforts have led to intense debates concerning the very meaning of the FAA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Janice Sue Miller ("Miller") worked as a property manager for Public Storage
Management, Inc. ("Public Storage").5 At a performance review conducted in
August 1993,6 Public Storage presented Miller with an employment contract
containing an arbitration clause providing that any dispute arising over employment
termination would be resolved by binding arbitration.7 The agreement stipulated that
any and all disputes concerning termination due to physical disabilities or medical
conditions would be resolved by means of arbitration." The agreement also provided
1. 121 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1997).
2. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1996).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1996). Section one has been deemed by many courts as the "exclusionary clause" or
"excepting clause." See United Electrical Workers of America v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d
221, 223 (4th Cir 1954).
4. United Electrical Workers of America is one case that has sought such a balance. Id.
5. Miller, 121 F.3d at 215.
6. The facts of Miller do not indicate whether these performance reviews were regular or merely
done capriciously.
7. Id. at 216.
8. Id. at 216 n.1.
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that only the arbitrator, not a judge or jury, would decide the dispute. 9 Miller initialed
each page of the document and signed the agreement. 10
Nearly two years later, in February 1995, Miller injured her arm at work and
eventually took a medical leave of absence." After eight months of leave, she was
still unable to return to work and was subsequently fired.'2
Miller filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 3 She subsequently received a Notice of Right to sue.'4
She brought suit against Public Storage, citing both violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") 5 and retaliation under the Texas Labor Code.16
Public Storage successfully moved to dismiss Miller's suit and compel
arbitration.'7 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas held
that under the Federal Arbitration Act, 8 the arbitration agreement in her employment
contract was valid and enforceable.' 9 The district court, noting the broad scope of the
exclusionary clause in section 1 of the FAA, ruled that Miller's employment contract
easily fell within its auspices.20
Miller appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,2"
basing her appeal upon three substantial claims.22 She claimed that the legislative
history of the ADA indicates that Congress did not intend for arbitration clauses to
prevent individuals from bringing suit for alleged ADA violations.23 Miller also
contended that the circumstances under which she signed the contract constituted
unconscionability and fraud.24
Most importantly, Miller asserted that the FAA's scope did not cover her
employment contract with Public Storage.25 Since the FAA excludes from its reach
the employment contracts of seamen, railroad employees, and any other class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce,26 Miller asserted that employment contracts
for workers generally engaged in interstate commerce should also be excluded from
the FAA's intended scope.27 Claiming that her employment as a property manager
was well within the scope of interstate commerce, she argued that the FAA did not
9. Id.





15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
16. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-.003.
17. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
18. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1996).




23. Id. at 218.
24. Id. at 218. At trial and in her appellate argument, Miller claimed she was given insufficient
time to read the contract. The court, however, gives little deference to this issue. Id. at 217-18.
25. Id. at 217.
26. 9 U.S.C. §1 (1996).
27. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
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apply to her employment contract.2 s Therefore, she should not have been forced to
arbitrate her claim.29
The Fifth Circuit rejected all of Miller's arguments.3 ° They reaffirmed the
decision of the district court, 3' explaining that the explicit language of the ADA
advocated the use of arbitration,3 2 and that fraud in the inducement did not apply to
the making of the arbitration agreement.3' Finally, the court held that when an
employee agrees to arbitrate disputes with an employer, the language in section 1 of
the FAA precluding arbitration for employees involved in interstate commerce
should only be applicable to employees actually engaged in the movement of goods
in interstate commerce.34 Therefore, since Miller was not specifically engaged in the
movement of goods in interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act should
apply,35 and Miller must submit to arbitration.36
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. The Federal Arbitration Act's Exclusionary Clause read narrowly
Senior Judge Peck commented in Bacashihua v. U.S. Postal Service3 7 that
"[t]he proper interpretation of the exclusionary provision in 9 U.S.C. section 1 has
been subject to much debate. '38 He further noted that one particular area of dispute
involves whether the language "workers engaged in interstate commerce" requires
the workers to be personally engaged in such interstate commerce.39
A significant number of federal courts have read the statute as requiring the
worker in question to be directly involved in interstate commerce, for example,
employed in the transportation industries, in order for the exclusionary provision to
take effect.4° The seminal case on this issue is a 1953 Third Circuit decision, Tenney
Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers ofAmerica, Local
4374. In Tenney, the plaintiff brought suit for damages for breach of contract.42 The
contract contained an arbitration clause, and defendants moved for a stay of suit
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 219.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 217.
33. Id. at 218. The court specifically stated that fraud in the inducement relates to formation of the
contract as a whole and not merely to the making of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, fraud in the
inducement is a moot issue. Id.
34. Id. at 217.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 219. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the holding of the district court.
37. 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1988).
38. Id. at 404.
39. Id.
40. See also Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 150, 351
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159
(7th Cir. 1984).
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pending arbitration.43 Although both parties conceded that plaintiff's employees were
engaged in the manufacture of goods for interstate commerce, 44 the court interpreted
the statutory language as exempting from the statute "only those other classes of
workers who are likewise engaged directly in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce."
45
In Tenney, the Third Circuit grappled with determining the meaning the 1925
Congress desired to attach to the phrase "workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 46 The issue arose eighteen years later in Dickstein v. duPont47 and
Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club.48 Dickstein, a First Circuit decision,
again involved an action for a breach of contract based on an agreement which
contained an arbitration clause.49 In construing whether a financial "registered
representative" is involved in interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the court
emphatically dismissed the plaintiff's claim, holding that the employee must be
involved in, or closely related to, the actual movement of goods in interstate
commerce.5 0 Erving, a Second Circuit breach of contract case concerning basketball
great Julius Erving,5" cited Dickstein with approval, explaining that due to the strong
national interest favoring arbitration, there is no reason to give an expansive
interpretation to the exclusionary language of section 1 of the FAA.52
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit narrowed the definition of "workers engaged in
interstate commerce."53 Miller Brewing Company v. Brewery Workers Local Union
No. 9, AFL-CIO involved a plaintiff wishing to set aside an arbitrator's award to the
union.54 The Miller court ultimately found that a multi-employer collective
bargaining agreement with Milwaukee brewery workers did not exclude the issue
from arbitration, as 9 U.S.C. § 1 had been held to be limited to workers employed
in the transportation industries.55
Two relatively recent decisions have affirmed the narrow construction of the
section 1 exclusionary provision. In a Fifth Circuit case, Rojas v. TK
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 452.
46. Id.
47. 443 F.2d 783 (lst Cir. 1971).
48. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Dickstein, 443 F.2d at 784-85. As a condition precedent to employment with duPont, Dickstein
was required to submit an "Application for Approval of Employment" to the New York Stock Exchange.
This application stated in part that all controversies arising out of employment or termination thereof
would be settled by arbitration. The plaintiff Dickstein questioned the applicability of the FAA to his
situation and the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself. Id. This issue also arose in Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 306 (6th Cir. 1991) and in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
50. Dickstein, F.2d. at 785.
51. Erving, 468 F.2d at 1066. The court, in view of the publicity surrounding "Dr. J," admitted to
not being surprised at the amount of "perhaps pardonable exaggeration and bombast" in the claims of
both parties. The court noted that Erving's counsel repeated, "ad nauseam," that the sum of $500,000
was inadequate compensation for Julius Erving. Id. at 1066-67.
52. Id. at 1069.
53. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, AFL-CIO, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162
(7th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 1161.
55. Id. at 1162.
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Communications, Inc.,5 6 the court found that a radio disk jockey was not involved
in interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA;57 in Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v.
Bates,58 the Sixth Circuit found that an employment agreement between a consultant
and his corporate employer was not employment vis-a-vis foreign or interstate
commerce.59 Asplundh noted that every circuit court that has addressed the question
of the exclusionary clause since Tenney has advocated narrow construction; only one
circuit has ruled differently.60 Asplundh cites to DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank,6'
a New York District Court case which provides rationalization of a narrow
constructional approach. The reference to seamen and railroad employees suggests
that Congress intended to refer to workers engaged in interstate commerce in the
same manner as those aforementioned employees.62
B. The Federal Arbitration Act's Exclusionary Clause read broadly
Despite Asplundh's assertion that the majority of appellate jurisdictions
advocate narrow construction of the interstate commerce clause in section 1 of the
FAA, 63 a few courts and justices, including several justices on the United States
Supreme Court, have advocated a broad interpretation. In a 1954 case, United
Electrical Radio & Machine Workers ofAmerica v. Miller Metal Products, Inc.,64 the
Fourth Circuit unequivocally rejected the Tenney court's reasoning and stated that
the statute should be construed as applying to employees engaged in the production
of goods for interstate commerce as well as employees engaged in the transportation
of goods in interstate commerce. 65 Consequently, an action for breach of a no-strike
clause in a collective bargaining agreement was excluded from arbitration.66
In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,67 the plaintiff, a former securities
employee, wished to bring a sexual harassment suit against her former employer and
forego arbitration. 6' Although the court held that discrimination claims were subject
to the arbitration clause in the Securities Registration Form which plaintiff had
executed, 69 a mention of section 1 of the FAA was made in dicta.70 The court
emphasized that because of Congress' determination in Title VII that any employer
with fifteen or more employees necessarily implicates interstate commerce, such
employment contracts would be included within the "contracts of employment"
56. 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
57. Id. at 747.
58. 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 601.
60. Id. at 599. The one circuit that has ruled differently is the Fourth Circuit in United Electrical
Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954). Id.
at 601. See discussion infra notes 63-66.
61. DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
62. DiCrisci, 807 F. Supp. at 953.
63. Asplundh, 71 F.3d at 599.
64. 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
65. Id. at 224.
66. Id. at 221.
67. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 306.
69. Id. at 312.
70. Id. at 311-12.
1998]
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stipulation in section 1 of the FAA.7 Therefore, such employment contracts would
be excluded from the FAA.7" The court added that it could see no reason why
individual employment contracts involving employees within interstate commerce
should be handled differently.73
A landmark case on this issue, and a case that indicates some of the propensities
of United States Supreme Court Justices, is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.74 Petitioner Gilmer was required by the respondent, his employer, to register
as a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange.7' The registration
application included a stipulation that Gilmer would be required to arbitrate any
controversy arising from a termination of employment.76 When Gilmer was
terminated at age 62, he brought suit in New York District Court, alleging that he
had been discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.77
Respondent's motion to compel arbitration was denied by the district court; however,
the court of appeals reversed.7
Although the Supreme Court ultimately compelled arbitration,79 the court's
majority opinion never addressed the extent of Gilmer's association with interstate
commerce." Despite the fact that several amici briefs argued that section 1 of the
FAA should exclude all "contracts of employment," the majority asserted that since
Gilmer had failed to raise the issue in the courts below and had not presented the
issue in the petition of certiorari, they need not address the issue.8"
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall,12 dissented, primarily advocating
that arbitration clauses contained in employment agreements should be exempt from
FAA coverage.83 Stevens believed the court should have addressed so crucial an
issue sua sponte, as many amici had briefed and raised the issue." In support of his
viewpoint, Stevens cited Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearings concerning the
bill. He quoted the chairman of the drafting committee, who "assured the Senators
that the bill 'is not intended [to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all."'83
Stevens also cited Senator Walsh, another member of the subcommittee, who
expressed his concern that "a great many of these contracts that are entered into are
really not [voluntary] things at all. ' '8 6 As a result, Stevens explained that the
exclusion in section 1 of the FAA should be interpreted to cover any agreements by
71. Id. at 311.
72. Id.
73. Willis, 948 F.2d at 312.
74. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).




79. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
80. Id at 25 n.2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 36-38.
85. Id. at 39. These Judiciary Subcommittee hearings were held in or around 1923. Id.
86. Id.
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the employer to arbitrate disputes with the employer arising out of such a
relationship, especially when such agreements are conditions of employment.87
It is apparent that at least one Supreme Court Justice has strong feelings about
the construction of the exclusionary provision. This is pertinent, because technically,
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue.88 Presently, there are internal
inconsistencies among the circuits as well. The Third Circuit, forum of the Tenney
decision, has also found that the FAA by its own terms, does not apply to
employment contracts.8 9 Puzzlingly, this broad reading was handed down by the
same circuit that had stated the exclusionary clause should apply only to workers
directly engaged in the movement of "interstate or foreign commerce or work so
closely related therein as to be in practical effect a part of it." 90
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Miller v. Public Storage Management, the court framed the issue in terms of
whether the exclusionary provision should broadly apply to all employment
contracts or narrowly apply to those employment contracts of workers directly
engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce. 9' The Fifth Circuit
unequivocally utilized a narrow interpretation of the interstate commerce clause in
section 1 of the FAA 92 and upheld the district court's ruling that the case should be
submitted to arbitration. 93
This outcome was consistent with the leading Fifth Circuit case on the
construction of the exclusionary clause, Rojas v. TK Communications.94 The Miller
court relied solely upon and reaffirmed the Rojas test, which had quoted Asplundh
Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, stating that the exclusionary clause of the FAA applies
only to employees "actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate
commerce in the same way that seamen and railroad workers are."95 The court
concluded that "under Rojas, Miller is bound by the arbitration clause in her
employment contract. 96
In addressing the appellant's argument, the court was compelled to address the
applicability of Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union,97 and promptly dismissed its
87. Id. at 40.
88. Id. at 25 n.2. The Supreme Court did not address the scope of the section one inclusion in
Gilmer. Id.
89. Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (3rd Cir. 1993).
The case, in differentiating between contracts of employment and pension plan agreements, states that
"[appellees] correctly note that the FAA by its own terms does not apply to employment contracts." Id.
However, this issue is not central to the holding and would probably be construed as dicta.
90. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452.
91. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
92. Id. at 218.
93. Id. at 219.
94. Rojas v. TK Communications, 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
95. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
96. Id. at 218.
97. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
1998]
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relevance to the issue at hand. 98 In Lincoln Mills, the Fifth Circuit held a collective
bargaining agreement was a contract of employment within the meaning of the FAA
exclusionary clause and therefore was excluded from the FAA's application." The
court distinguished Lincoln Mills from the present case, emphasizing that Lincoln
Mills raised concerns about the collective bargaining agreements between labor
unions and large corporations.'00 Since Miller's contract was merely an agreement
between an employer and an employee, Lincoln Mills was inapplicable and Rojas
was applied.'0 '
The court emphasized that Congress had failed to broaden the FAA section 1
exclusionary provision through statutory language. 0 2 Since there had been no
congressional modifications of the FAA, Miller explained that the courts should not
undertake to expand the reach of the statute and that any broader interpretation of
that clause would underscore its significance.' 3
The Miller court does not address the often conflicting viewpoints in other
circuits. With the exception of mentioning Asplundh in a string citation,0 4 the court
fails to discuss the modi operandi of any other circuits, including the conflicting
viewpoints of the Fourth Circuit'0 5 and Justice Stevens' dissent in Gilmer. 16
Although there is no internal conflict within the Fifth Circuit concerning the
exclusionary clause of the FAA, there are still conflicting interpretations existing
among the other various circuits.
V. COMMENT
The majority rule concemring the exclusionary clause of the FAA is obvious.
Each circuit court which has addressed the scope of the exclusionary clause, with the
exception of the Fourth Circuit, has held that it should be interpreted in a narrow
fashion.0 7 Miller adheres to this viewpoint as well."'B
Although there exists a well-defined majority rule, this majority rule is not
entirely immune from criticism. The issue has yet to be considered by the United
States Supreme Court,'0 9 and at least one Justice has very forceful opinions contrary
98. Miller, 121 F.3dat218.
99. Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d at 86.
100. Miller, 121 F.3dat218.
101. Id. The court distinguished the cases by explaining that the holding in Lincoln Mills that the
FAA does not authorize arbitration in disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements does not
conflict with the Rojas holding that workers not directly involved in the transport of goods in interstate
commerce are subject to the requirements of the FAA. Id.
102. Id. at 217.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 215 F.2d 224.
106. Gilmer. 500 U.S. at 36.
107. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 71 F.3d at 599.
108. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217. A broad interpretation of the exclusionary clause would undermine its
significance. Id.
109. The court refused to address the issue in Gilmer. In particular, the court stated that since Gilmer
did not raise the issue in the courts below and since it was not among the questions presented in the
petition for certiorari, they would disregard the issue. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
[Vol. 1998, No. I
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to the majority rule."' Thus, if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to consider
the extent of the exclusionary rule, at the very least, a lively argument would be
generated.
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the FAA was the topic of
specific discussion by Stevens in his Gilmer dissent."' As previously mentioned, the
chairman of the ABA committee responsible for drafting the FAA, assured the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee that the bill "is not intended [to] be an act referring
to labor disputes, at all.""..2 The chairman unequivocally noted that the purpose of the
act is to give merchants the right or privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each
other as to what their damages are. "3 Senator Walsh, expressed his concerns that
[t]he trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts are
really not voluntary at all. Take an insurance policy; there is a blank in
it. The agent has no power at all to decide it... it is the same with a
good many contracts of employment. A man says, "These are our
terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is nothing for the man
to do except sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case
tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he
has no confidence at all.'4
Such comments suggest, in and of themselves, that the framers and constructors of
the FAA did not mean for the act to apply to ordinary employment contracts.
Not only is the legislative history dissonant with the majority viewpoint, but the
Senator's comments acknowledge the modem dilemma of contract negotiations
between understandably naYve employees and sophisticated employers. Two primary
reasons exist for lack of employee bargaining power. First, a great number of
employees, in exchange for receiving treasured work and employment opportunities,
sign "form" contracts which are not challenged for fear of abdicating their job
opportunities. Prospective employees are faced with the choice of either signing the
contracts containing such clauses or refusing to sign them and finding other
employment." 5 If they attempt to argue over a seemingly meaningless arbitration
clause, the employer may simply eliminate that employee from the running. 116 Such
a lack of bargaining power is all too likely in today's saturated workforce. A second
reason these arbitration clauses should be viewed as suspect is their omnipresence
110. Id. at 36. (Stevens, dissenting).
11. Id. at 36-38.
112. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Anthony J. Jacob, Expanding Judicial Review to Encourage Employers and Employees to
Enter the Arbitration Arena, 30J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1099, 1118 (1997), (citing Wade Lambert, Legal
Beat, Employee Pacts to Arbitrate Sought by Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct 22, 1992 at B 1 ).
116. Recall Senator Walsh's comments in discussing the FAA: "These are our terms. All right, take
it or leave it." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39.
1998]
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within boilerplate contractual language. This language is often difficult for a
layperson to understand and can lead to claims of unconscionability. "7
For these dual reasons, Congress should not perpetuate the unequal distribution
of power by authorizing near-total compliance with these often biased arbitration
clauses. Granted, the FAA establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration;"'
however, such a policy should not come at the expense of relatively powerless
employees.
A semantic quagmire that accompanies a narrow reading of the exclusionary
clause involves its compatibility with section 2 of the FAA. Section 2 of the FAA
reads, in part, "[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." This FAA section has
been traditionally construed as broadly as Congress' power to regulate under the
commerce clause." 9 Many courts have had no problem construing section two's
"commerce" as being overly broad, yet have expressed disdain at broadening the
exclusionary clause's definition of "interstate commerce." 20 Mired by this
inconsistency, other courts have simply applied the broad view of interstate
commerce to both sections.' 2' The Fourth Circuit invoked uniformity, claiming
"[t]here is no reason to think that it was not intended that the exception incorporated
in the statute should not reach also to the full extent of its powers."2
Academics also have promoted logical uniformity within the confmes of the
FAA. Professor Cox of Harvard Law School has stated that "[o]ne should not rely
on one policy in interpreting the phrases relating to commerce and an opposite
conception in reading 'contract of employment'.' 2 3 Cox relies upon Congressional
intent in establishing a uniform definition, stating that "[t]oday Congress probably
uses these phrases as words of art, but it is hard to believe that they were so
understood in 1924 [as possessing different meanings], long before such precise
distinctions were introduced by the Court.' 24 He concludes that the two phrases
should be made coextensive if the interpretation of the statute is to be guided by a
policy distrustful of judicial intervention. 25
117. Unconscionability is defined by the U.C.C. as "whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-
sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract." U.C.C. 2-302, Comment 1, cited in FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2nd edition, 1990).
118. Moses H. Cone v. Mercury, 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983).
119. Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th Cir. 1986), (stating that concerning the FAA, "the
requirement that the underlying transaction involve commerce is to be broadly construed as to be
coextensive with congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.) See also Mesa
Operating Limited Partnership v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1986)
(mentioning in part that commerce under the FAA includes all contracts "relating to interstate
commerce")
120. The Miller court follows such a precedent. Miller, 121 F.3d at 217.
121. United Electrical. Radio & Machine Workers ofAmerica, 215 F.2d at 224.
122. Id.
123. Archibald Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts. 67 HARV. L. REv. 591, 599
(1954).
124. Id. at 598.
125. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The topic presented here is pertinent not only because of the arbitration issuesit raises, but also because of the recent overhauling of the Commerce Clause since
United States v. Lopez. -'2 6 Interstate commerce is hardly a stagnant issue, it is
constantly being refined and redefined, and its definition is often controversial.
The majority rule of narrow construction of the FAA exclusionary provision
is clearly demarcated by the federal appellate courts. However, this analysis has
fallen upon sharp criticism by scholars, academics, and even members of the United
States Supreme Court. Uniformity of definition seems to be the major concem of the
academics; interpretation of the legal history seems to be the major concern of thelegal practitioners and judges. For now, the narrowly conceived definition is firmly
rooted in the majority of federal courts.
Notwithstanding Lopez, the FAA needs some internal consistency concerning
its application of interstate commerce. Although Lopez has narrowed the definition
of interstate commerce, this limitation has hardly reached the rigid proportions given
to the FAA exclusionary clause by nearly all the Appellate Circuits.'27 The majority
of the courts' definition of employees in interstate commerce in the exclusionary
clause as "those employees directly engaged in interstate commerce," such as
seamen and railroad employees, leads to ancillary problems. What if an employee
works as a bus driver for a company that normally offers interstate transportation,
but he or she does not actually drive for those trips? What about a railroad employee
who loads new automobiles onto trains, half of which remain in the state and half of
which are transported over state lines? Must expensive and irrelevant discovery bedone to determine whether the employee is involved in interstate commerce?Professor Cox has provided an easier and workable alternative; the two phrases
should be made coextensive if the interpretation of the statute ought to be guided by
a policy distrustful of judicial intervention. 28
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126. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Supreme Court abandoned the traditional broad definition
of commerce and adopted a more narrow one that focused upon economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.
127. The one exception is the Fourth Circuit. See note 107 and the accompanying text.
128. See note 123 and accompanying text.
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